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THE EVOLUTION OF LABOR ARBITRATION
MORTON GITELMAN

Any dispute, claim or grievance arising out of or relating to the interpretation or the application of this agreement shall be submitted to
arbitration under the Voluntary Labor Arbitration Rules of the
American Arbitration Association. The parties further agree to accept the arbitrator's award as final and binding upon them.'
HE HISTORY

of labor arbitration, like Gaul, is divided into three

parts-the pre-World War 11 stirrings, the mushrooming of

the war years and the postwar period of growth and development. The historical development of labor arbitration is not a mere
curiosity for postprandial discourse, but an important consideration
in attempting to understand the process as it exists and in evaluating
the process as a method of resolving industrial disputes. The process
has been constantly evolving and today is quite different when compared with earlier periods of its growth; there are indications that
the future will bring definite changes. The purpose of this paper,
then, is to examine the factors which have influenced grievance
arbitration as we know it today, look at some of the current patterns
evolving and project the process into the future.
EARLY BEGINNINGS OF LABOR ARBITRATION

Recognition of arbitration as a method of resolving disputes between labor and management came as early as 1886. In that year,
President Cleveland, in a message to Congress, recommended a national system of voluntary arbitration:
I am satisfied that something may be done under federal authority to prevent
the disturbances which so often arise from disputes between the employers and
the employed, and which at times threaten the business interests of the country;
and in my opinion, the proper theory upon which to proceed is that of voluntary
arbitration as a means of settling these difficulties. But I suggest that instead of
arbitrators chosen in the heat of conflicting claims there should be created a

commission of labor consisting of three members who shall be regular officers
of the government, charged, among other duties, with the consideration 2and
settlement, when possible, of all controversies between Capital and Labor.
1 Standard arbitration clause recommended by the American Arbitration Association.
2

Lapp, Labor Arbitration 5 (New York, 1942).

MR. GITELMAN is an instructor at the University of Illinois College of Law and a
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The President's efforts were, more or less fruitless, for although Congress responded with legislation culminating in the 1898 Erdman
4
Act,' no voluntary arbitrations were entered into until 1905.
The first successful test for voluntary arbitration came in the 1903
anthracite coal strike. As a result of that arbitration, a permanent
system of arbitrating grievances in the industry was established. Other
industries, primarily printing, also began arbitrating in the early
years of the twentieth century. The early arbitrations were primarily
directed at settling violent strikes and much of what was then called
arbitration would today fall in the category of mediation and conciliation. Voluntary arbitration was conceived of as a last resort when
all other methods of settling strikes failed.
Grievance arbitration-the settlement of disputes concerning interpretation and application of the terms of collective bargaining
agreements-had its origins in the years immediately preceding World
War I. The men's clothing industry developed plans for arbitrating
such disputes which came to full flower in the twenties. Other garment industries and the full-fashioned hosiery industry followed the
lead of the Hart, Schaffner & Marx and Chicago Men's Clothing
agreements. In all of these grievance arbitration experiences, however, the arbitrators did as much negotiating and mediating as arbitrating.5 The real story of grievance arbitration does not begin until
the advent of widespread collective bargaining.
With the growth of unionism and collective bargaining after the
depression, arbitration took on new meaning. In order to prevent
work interruption during the life of collective agreements, provisions
for a grievance procedure culminating in reference of unsettled disputes to an arbitrator or an arbitration board were written into the
agreements. Arbitration was emerging as a method of interpreting
and applying the agreement. This period, between the depression
and World War II, was the real beginning of grievance arbitration.
A large factor in popularizing the new concept of grievance arbitration was the entrance into the field by the American Arbitration
Association in 1937. At that time, the Association had ten years of
experience in handling commercial arbitrations and had earned much
8 30 Star. 424 (1898).
4 In that year several railroad disputes went to arbitration under the Act, and arbitration has remained an important factor in settling railroad disputes.
5

Witte, Historical Survey of Labor Arbitration 36 (Philadelphia, 1952).
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respect. During its existence the AAA had received many requests
to provide labor arbitrators and in 1937 acceded to the requests and
formed its Voluntary Industrial Arbitration Tribunal. The immediate
contributions of the AAA were to provide a source of impartial
arbitrators and formulate an arbitration procedure designed to provide a fair hearing for both sides. In the first three years of operation
the AAA Tribunal handled 400 controversies and practically every
one of the awards was complied with.6 Today, the AAA handles
several thousand grievance arbitrations each year and maintains a
panel of more than 13,000 arbitrators.
Grievance arbitration was growing side by side with the increase
in collective bargaining. It remained, however, for the years of World
War II and the National War Labor Board to introduce grievance
arbitration as a way of industrial life.
THE WAR YEARS AND THE NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD

By 1941 some 62 percent of the 1,200 collective bargaining agreements on file with the United States Conciliation Service contained
arbitration provisions. 7 The onset of a defense economy and the tremendous increase in defense production in 1940 focused public and
governmental attention on the mounting strike rate in "defense"
industries. Some sort of government action was deemed necessary to
reduce the work stoppages which were threatening to undermine
mobilization efforts. Consequently, early in 1941, President Roosevelt
created the National Defense Mediation Board (NDMB).8 The
Board was to provide mediation assistance in contract negotiations
and provide facilities for voluntary arbitration. In the eight months
of its operation, the NDMB was fairly successful in keeping work
stoppages at a minimum; its operations however, were primarily in
a mediation context.9
After Pearl Harbor the need for a wartime production effort unimpaired by work stoppages became acute. The NDMB machinery had
6

For a report on the first three years of arbitration of labor disputes by the AAA,
see 5 Arb. J. 65 (1941).
7 Steelman, The Work of the United States Conciliation Service in Wartime Labor
Disputes, 9 Law &Contemp. Prob. 461,466 (1942).
8 Exec. Order No. 8,716, 6 Fed. Reg. 1,532 (1941).
9 For an excellent analysis of the NDMB, see Taylor, Government Regulation of
Industrial Relations 90 et seq. (New York, 1948).
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broken down over a dispute as to union security, 10 and a LaborManagement Conference convened immediately after Pearl Harbor
reached agreement only on a no-strike, no-lockout pledge and an
approval of voluntary arbitration. 1 In January, 1942, the President
established the National War Labor Board (NWLB), a tripartite
board consisting of labor, industry and public members. 1 2 The Board
was charged with settling labor disputes which might interfere with
the war effort, and was authorized to use a variety of methods to
achieve that end.
The procedures for adjusting and settling labor disputes which might interrupt work which contributes to the effective prosecution of the war shall be as
follows: (a) The parties shall first resort to direct negotiations or to the procedures provided in a collective bargaining agreement. (b) If not settled in this
manner, the Commissioners of Conciliation of the Department of Labor shall
be notified if they have not already intervened in the dispute. (c) If not promptly
settled by conciliation, the Secretary of Labor shall certify the dispute to the
Board, provided, however, that the Board in its discretion after consultation with
the Secretary may take jurisdiction of the dispute on its own motion. After it
takes jurisdiction, the Board shall finally determine the dispute, and for this purpose may use mediation, voluntary arbitration, or arbitration under rules established by the Board. 18

The bulk of the NWLB work was settling disputes concerning
wages and union security. The Board was more concerned with
threatened work stoppages during collective bargaining negotiation
than with grievance arbitration problems and, in order to keep the
case load within realistic proportions, often referred grievances back
to the parties. 1 4 Where the parties had circumvented existing provisions for arbitration in their agreement, the Board was adamant in
refusing to decide the dispute. The Board did, however, recognize
the importance of grievance machinery and, from the first, encouraged inclusion of arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements. On July 1, 1943, the Board issued a statement:
The basis for the national war labor policy in America today is still the voluntary agreement between the responsible leaders of labor and industry that there
be no strikes or lockouts for the duration of the war. All labor disputes, including grievances, therefore, must be settled by peaceful means.... [TIhe grievance
10 Bull. No. 1009, U.S. Dept. of Labor 42 (1950).

"1Ibid., at 49.
12Exec. Order 9,017, 7 Fed. Reg. 237 (1942).
13 Ibid.
14 Bull. No. 1009, U.S. Dept. of Labor 18 (1950).
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procedure, whatever be its adaptation to the needs of the plant, should provide
for the final and binding settlement of all grievances not otherwise resolved. For
this purpose, provision should be made for the settlement of grievances by an
arbitrator, impartial chairman or umpire under terms and conditions agreed to
by the parties. 15

The Board recommended voluntary grievance machinery and arbitration and even ordered arbitration in given disputes; l6 however,
the Board did not go so far as to order arbitration of future grievances
where existing contract terms did not so provide.' 7 That both labor
and management responded to NWLB prodding by contracting for
grievance machinery and arbitration is readily understandable in
view of the fact that the only peaceful alternative would be direct
government intervention in day-to-day plant affairs.
It is obvious that as a result of NWLB policy and decision, grievance arbitration was common during the war years. How prevalent
the practice was cannot be ascertained as there was no reporting of
grievance arbitration awards during the period. By the end of the
war, it was apparent that grievance arbitration was gaining respect
as a device for settling disputes in the administration of collective
bargaining agreements.
The grievance procedures directed by the Board have by and large received
the whole-hearted support of business and labor.... The voluntary practice of
many parties to provide arbitration as the final step of the grievance procedure
has increased during the war. The Board's decisions . . . have helped prove to
large segments of industry and labor that arbitration clauses which skilfully
define the arbitrator's jurisdiction do not jeopardize the stability of contract provisions or encourage disagreement in the plant.'s

The question looming on the horizon as the war drew to a close
was whether the removal of government control over industry and
labor would undo the work of the NWLB. The parties were chafing
at the bit of government restrictions, especially in the area of wage
controls. With the end of the NWLB and the National Wage Stabilization Board, wholesale industrial warfare and a paralyzing onset of
strikes and lockouts were predicted. Would the relative industrial
peace of the war years disintegrate?
15 1 National War Labor Board Termination Report 65 (Washington, 1947).
16 Montgomery Ward & Co., 10 War Lab. Rep. 415 (1943).
17 Aluminum Co. of America, 17 War Lab. Rep. 352 (1944).

is Freidin and Ulman, Arbitration and the National War Labor Board, 58 Harv. L.
Rev. 309, 360 (1945).
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POSTWAR DEVELOPMENT OF LABOR ARBITRATION

With the end of the war in 1945 came the expiration of the nostrike, no-lockout pledge. Both labor and management were anxious
to escape the yoke of the NWLB. Since the Board's authority was
founded on the no-strike, no-lockout pledge, and the parties no
longer considered the pledge binding, it was inevitable that the
Board's work would soon be terminated. Consequently, the NWLB
decided to wind up its affairs by January 1, 1946, which it did. In
the meantime, the government was faced with the sizeable problem
of winning the peace, a cause which required continued industrial
peace. One thing was certain; any plan for keeping work stoppages
at a minimum had to be voluntary on the part of labor and management.
On November 5, 1945, the President convened a Labor-Management Conference whose goal was to reach agreement on basic postwar policy issues confronting industrial relations.' 9 Although there
were many areas of disagreement, the Conference was a success in
two respects: For the first time, management formally recognized
the principle of collective bargaining; the Conference unanimously
recommended the use of arbitration to resolve disputes over application of contract terms. Thus the parties agreed that grievance arbitration was desirable. What factors led to agreement on this issue?
The war increased greatly the number of collective bargaining
agreements, especially in the large manufacturing industries. One of
the natural developments of collective bargaining was the development of a grievance procedure to administer the agreement. Experience with arbitration during NWLB days generally proved to be a
satisfactory manner of resolving industrial disputes. Management and
labor, due to the tripartite approach during the war, came to repose
more confidence in each other's abilities; responsible leadership was
evident on both sides. Also, the war period developed a large number
of persons qualified in the arena of industrial dispute. These individuals were able to appreciate the problems of labor and management; they were impartial and expert in many areas of industrial life.
Immediately after the war, there was a desire to return to an industrial co-existence relieved of government intervention. Leaders on
both sides realized that unless a voluntary method of resolving dis19 For a report on this conference, see Bull. No. 77, U.S. Dept of Labor, Div of Lab.
Standards (1946).
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putes without extended use of economic warfare was agreed upon,
government intervention might result. Voluntary arbitration as the
final step in a grievance procedure was tried and tested, and undoubtedly the best alternative to work stoppage as a means of resolving differences.
Labor, not willing to risk adverse public opinion and desiring to
avoid government intervention, was willing to place in abeyance the
right to strike, provided a fair and impartial means for being heard
was provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. The public
acceptance of arbitration, the large number of qualified arbitrators
being available, and the fact that labor unionism and collective
bargaining were firmly entrenched in industrial life probably all contributed to the general acceptance by labor of grievance arbitration
as a means of resolving the day-to-day differences in administration
and interpretation of agreements.
Management expressed the fear that labor would use the defense
efforts and wartime experience to consolidate its interests and make
new gains. However, after the war, it was obvious that collective
bargaining was here to stay and that the entire future of industrial
relations was inextricably bound up with collective bargaining. Although management was probably still wary of the efficacy of arbitration and afraid of future inroads on areas always considered management prerogatives, the fact that the Administration was regarded
as being pro-labor, coupled with the fact that labor was willing to
substitute arbitration for work stoppage, prompted management to
accept the proposition of grievance arbitration.
Since 1945, grievance arbitration has become a routine way of life
under collective bargaining agreements, while arbitration in connection with negotiation of new agreements has, more or less, fallen by
the wayside. As agreements have become more complex and expanded into new areas of industrial life, so has arbitration expanded.
Additional impetus was provided by National Labor Relations Board
decisions to the effect that in grievances which also constitute unfair
labor practices, the NLRB will not, as a rule, take jurisdiction if ar20
bitration is provided for in the agreement.
Today, grievance arbitration is a big .business.21 Both the Federal
20

Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 161 F.2d 949 (C.A. 6th, 1947).
21 While exact figures are not available regarding the number of arbitrations held
throughout the country, the following statistics are indicative of a widespread accept-

1tllDE
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Mediation and Conciliation Service and the American Arbitration
Association provide procedures and arbitrators for interested parties.
Arbitrators have come to be recognized as a professional group; in
1947 the National Academy of Arbitrators was founded. Arbitration
literature, including reports of awards, constitutes a sizeable portion
of professional libraries. Grievance arbitration is still growing and,
what is more important, evolving. Examination of some of the current
features and patterns of this process indicates that grievance arbitration has not yet settled into a permanent niche of industrial relations.
It is time now to turn to these current problems and see how they will
affect the future of the process.
PATTERNS OF LABOR ARBITRATION

Grievance arbitration is a comparatively young device for the
settlement of industrial disputes. Even though the vast majority of
collective bargaining agreements contains arbitration provisions, 22 it

is difficult to discern many clear, general principles applicable to
grievance arbitration as a whole. There are several factors which
account for this lack of general concepts.
Until recent years, there was no satisfactory reporting system for
arbitration awards. 23 Even today, the bulk of awards are not published. Grievance arbitration, after all, is a device of the parties to the
bargaining agreement, and the parties must authorize publication of
the awards. Thus, in many areas of dispute and geographic locales,
what the arbitrators are in fact doing is not available for study. This
is not to suggest that there is a paucity of reported awards; however,
the drawing of general conclusions is rendered more difficult by the
incomplete and selective reporting process.
Practices and problems vary from industry to industry, and even
among plants in any one industry. A satisfactory principle which has
evolved in the context, for example, of the construction industry
ance of the arbitral process: In 1958, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
received 2,326 requests for arbitrators. Report of Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service, 1958, 81 Monthly Labor Rev. 408 (1959); in 1956, the American Arbitration
Association reported a case load of 2,175 cases. Third Man Grows in Importance,
Business Week 174 (Sept. 7, 1957); the New York State Board of Mediation, most
active of the state agencies, handled 1,792 arbitration cases in 1956. Ibid.
22 Variously estimated at 90 to 95 per cent of the some 100,000 collective bargaining
agreements in force today.
23 E.g., the Bureau of National Affairs began publishing labor arbitration awards
in 1946.
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may be completely unsuited for application to the oil industry. Similarly, the problems of a New England textile mill may vary considerably from those of a Southern mill. The attitudes and experience
of the arbitrator may also retard the formulation of general principles. An arbitrator versed in the regional economic problems of New
England industry might find it impossible to accommodate his experience to a dispute in the California aircraft industry. Although
many individuals arbitrate on a nationwide or multi-regional basis,24
general principles which apply to all areas and all industries are very
few, if any.
There is also a divergence of opinion as to what the arbitrator's
function is in relation to grievance settlement. Some arbitrators feel
that a "labor relations" approach is necessary in resolving grievances;
the award must be palatable and enhance the future bargaining of the
parties. These arbitrators tend to mediate and negotiate with the
parties and look askance at any who would suggest that arbitration
is a quasi-judicial process concerned only with interpretation of the
agreement. The opposing school of arbitrators feel that arbitration
is the resolution of a dispute; this dispute should be resolved in relation to the terms of the bargaining agreement; the process is quasijudicial and does not allow for mediation or negotiation. This disagreement over the arbitrator's function militates against a conceptual
jurisprudence of grievance arbitration.
All of these factors-haphazard reporting, varying industrial practices, varying attitudes and experience among arbitrators, and the dispute of the arbitrators over their function-when combined with the
relative youth of grievance arbitration lead to the conclusion that
labor arbitration is an intensely casuistic process. Any two disputes,
ostensibly involving the same factual situation, may be resolved differently, each solution correct when viewed in the context of its
background. This casuistic, case by case approach can be compared
with the development of equity in the English common law. Equity
also began as an intense casuistic system, but by the nineteenth century had hardened into a rigid set of concepts which, in a number
of ways, resulted in harshness and hardships equivalent to those of
the common law. This comparison suggests that if grievance arbitration is to be moulded into a systematic, conceptual system of indus24 Arbitration and the Law 190 (Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Meeting, Nat'l
Academy of Arbitrators, Washington, 1959).
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trial jurisprudence, the most desirable aspects of the process, i.e.,
fluidness, adaptability and "custom tailored" awards, will be lost.
The desirability of a "custom tailored" award cannot be overemphasized. Most collective bargaining agreements run for one or more
years. Any arbitration award during the life of the agreement necessarily affects the continuing relationship of the parties under the
agreement. An arbitrator is always faced with the problem of whether
the parties can subsequently "live with the award." If a rigid set of
arbitration principles were to evolve, the continuing relationship of
the parties could suffer and awards might conceivably engender more
disputes than they would resolve.
The inability to formulate general concepts of grievance arbitration by no means disparages the process. As pointed out above, conceptualism could destroy the efficacy of arbitration as a means of
resolving industrial disputes. A case by case approach is, perhaps, a
major reason for the widespread acceptance of arbitration by industry and labor. Granting the premise that it is not desirable to
state general principles applicable to grievance arbitration today,
there are certain areas, patterns if you will, which are evolving and
may affect the future directions and ultimate fate of the arbitral
process. Some of these patterns, which indicate a trend toward
positivistic conceptualism, are the involvement of the legal profession
with arbitration, the use of precedent in the arbitral process and
judicial intervention in labor arbitration.
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND LABOR ARBITRATION

One of the distinguishing characteristics of labor arbitration as
compared with commercial arbitration is the large role of the lawyer
in the arbitral process. In commercial arbitration the lawyer is the
exception rather than the rule. Rarely are lawyers called upon to act
as commercial arbitrators and rarely are the parties to a commercial
arbitration represented by counsel. Commercial arbitration has developed apart from the law and legal profession and legal and judicial
concepts are studiously avoided. The brief history of labor arbitration, on the other hand, has involved a much greater participation by
the legal profession. A large percentage of the country's arbitrators
are lawyers or law professors. The recent history of grievance arbitration shows an increasing representation of parties by lawyers at
arbitration hearings. An American Arbitration Association study of
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1,183 labor arbitrations in 1954 indicated that in more than 34 percent of the cases, practicing attorneys arbitrated; 20 percent of the
arbitrators who listed educator as their occupation were law professors.25 In over 63 percent of the cases studied, attorneys represented
one or both parties. 26 The significant percentage of law-oriented
people involved in labor arbitration is reflected in the increasing
practice of taking transcripts at hearings and filing post-hearing
briefs.
The growing use of lawyers and the attendant multiplication of8
transcripts and briefs naturally result in delay and increased costs.1
However, this is but a surface symptom of what some consider a more
appellation coined to describe this problem is
serious problem. The
"creeping legalism." ' 9 Professor Stein, in a 1958 speech, stated:
A frustrating kind of legalism has crept into labor relations because the
arbitrator has come to function like a judge and the parties have come to treat
arbitration like litigation.... What has happened is that a device almost ideally
suited for the resolution of a handful of troublesome questions has been blown
up into a gigantic kind of business30which the parties have tended to make a central feature of industrial relations.

The criticism implies that not only formalism (transcripts, briefs,
formalized hearings) but legal concepts of contract interpretation
are undermining the collective bargaining process and may eventually
smother the process. The dire picture portrayed by "creeping legalism" has been attacked by Benjamin Aaron:
If the parties elect to limit the arbitrator's duties to the "judicial determination
of disputes," why should we denigrate their decision by characterizing it as
"creeping legalism"? ... In any case, formality v. informality is not, or should
not be, the issue: The important question is whether the procedure adopted
31
effectuates the purposes of the arbitration.

The various arguments against lawyers and legalism in labor arbitration tend to overlook the fact that labor arbitration, more than
any other process, is a device completely controlled by the parties.
25

12 Arb. J. ns. 67, 71 (1957).

26 Ibid., at 72.
27 In the same study, it was indicated that transcripts were taken in more than 22
per cent of the cases and briefs filed in almost 42 per cent. Ibid., at 75, 76.
28
Ross, The Well-Aged Arbitration Case, 11 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 262 (1958).
29 13 Arb. J. ns. 129 (1958).
3
o Stein, Arbitration and Industrial Jurisprudence, 81 Monthly Lab. Rev. 866 (1958).
31

Aaron, Labor Arbitration and Its Critics, 10 Lab. L. J. 605, 606, 607 (1959).
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The parties select the arbitrator; the parties present the case; the
parties request the transcript; the parties decide whether to file briefs.
The conclusion is inescapable that the parties desire the participation
of the legal profession and legalism. Although the increase in cost and
delay causes some apprehension, the increase still does not remotely
approach the costs and delays of the judicial process. That legalism
has aroused comment, 32 in itself suggests that this pattern is noteworthy. Whether the parties are finding themselves trapped in a legal
cage or whether they actually desire legalism does not affect the conclusion that this pattern is shaping the future of grievance arbitration.
USE OF PRECEDENT IN THE ARBITRAL PROCESS

One pattern developing in labor arbitration which causes some concern is the increasing citation of authority in post-hearing briefs and
arbitration awards. There has probably not been a great deal of reliance placed on authority by the arbitrators, but there is a great deal
of citation of authority which confronts the arbitrator after the hearing. Due to the widespread divergence of practices and problems
among industries and individual plants, it would indeed stultify the arbitral process if reliance on precedent becomes acceptable. However,
counterbalancing the undesirability of rigidifying the process through
use of precedent is the considerable benefit of promoting uniformity
and stability in any one plant or industry. This is most obvious in
those industries employing a permanent umpireship form of arbitration. Here, if the Umpire can introduce some semblance of uniformity by relying on his previous decisions, the ultimate decrease in the
number of similar grievances could be very gratifying. In the ad boc
type of arbitration there is little opportunity for establishing uniformity through use of precedent since the arbitrator is generally unaware of previous experiences of the parties.
Although the benefits and detriments resulting from the use of
precedent are fairly obvious, the question still remains, what is the
arbitrator to do when confronted with briefs heavily sprinkled with
citation of authority?
After all, an arbitrator who receives from either or both parties a voluminous
brief, crammed with citations to judicial decisions and arbitration awards, runs
certain risks: If he neglects to check such citations and to mention them in his
82 Platt, Current Criticisms of Labor Arbitration, in Arbitration and the Law vii
(Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Meeting, Nat'l Academy of Arbitrators, 1959).
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opinion, he may be accused of carelessness or arrogance; if he takes the opposite
course, he is likely to be charged with making a tiresome show of useless knowledge and of padding his fee as well. 33

There is, of course, no one-word solution to this problem. It seems,
however, that this particular pattern will evolve in the direction of
looking to authority for persuasive reasoning rather than binding
precedent. Citation of authority will increase and it is likely that the
future will see much more discussion of authority, especially in light
of the pattern of judicial intervention in the arbitral process.
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN LABOR ARBITRATION

Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama,34 represents a
turning point in the development of grievance arbitration. In that
case, the Supreme Court held that § 301 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act 35 requires the courts to develop a federal substantive
law of collective bargaining agreements; since an arbitration clause is
part of the collective agreement, the agreement to arbitrate is binding
and enforceable by a decree of specific performance. The effect of
the holding is to provide a federal district court forum for resisting or
compelling arbitration and resisting or compelling enforcement of an
arbitration award. One of the immediate implications of the decision
is a renewal of the question of whether the arbitrator or the court
should determine if a dispute is arbitrable under the particular arbitration clause in question.3 6 The full impact of the Lincoln Mills case
lies in the area of the fundamental relationship between arbitration
and the courts; which of the two processes is to have the primary responsibility of interpreting collective agreements? Some arbitrators
are concerned that federal court interpretation and construction of
collective bargaining agreements will emasculate grievance arbitration. The other extreme would take the position that since arbitrators
are not bound by the law, they can blithely ignore judicial pronouncements regarding interpretation of agreements. Perhaps the best
Aaron, op. cit. supra note 30 at 608.
34 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
33

3561 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1952): "(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees . . . may
be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties...."
86 For a discussion of who determines arbitrability, see Elkouri, How Arbitration
Works 36 (Washington, 1952).
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analysis of the future relationship between arbitration and the law is
expressed by Professor Cox:
Some interaction between arbitration and federal law is inevitable simply
because section 301 provides a forum in which to bring suits upon collective
bargaining agreements. The volume of litigation seems likely to increase. The
resulting rules of decision will affect later arbitration awards even though arbitrators are not required to follow the law. All arbitrators occasionally use court
decisions as precedents. Those who are lawyers will be influenced by legal analysis. So will the attorneys who represent companies and labor unions. When
experienced bargainers negotiate a contract, they do not ignore settled legal doctrines. Upon an application to compel or stay arbitration or to enforce or vacate
an award the court's attitude is bound to be affected by any prior judicial rulings
upon any issue tendered for the arbitrator's decision. Even though the thought
projects us some distance into the future, does it not seem likely also that the willingness to arbitrate will be affected by any sharp differences between the attitudes
of arbitrators and the doctrines which would prevail in a judicial forum?87

Many arbitrators are of the opinion that judicial interpretation of
collective bargaining agreements bodes ill for industrial relations.
There is feeling that collective bargaining agreements are not like
other contracts and that application of legal canons of contract interpretation will result in unrealistic decisions detrimental to the bargaining process. The implication is that courts are not equipped with
the expertise necessary to deal with collective agreements. 8
As yet there has been no great rush to the courts in the wake of the
Lincoln Mills case. However, if one side or the other discovers a tactical advantage is to be gained by resort to the courts, the volume of
litigation will undoubtedly increase. It is obvious that even if litigiousness increases, the federal courts will not put the arbitrators out of
business. However, the problem still remains, to what degree will the
courts impose legal conceptualism upon grievance arbitration? That
some imposition is inevitable cannot be questioned. If the arbitrators
are to prevent rampant judicial intervention and an ultimate shriveling of the arbitral process, Cox warns that the arbitrators must develop a "philosophy of grievance arbitration in terms which are familiar to the courts.""0 Whether there will be a great struggle between
87 Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration in the Light of the Lincoln Mills Case,
in Arbitration and the Law 24, 29 (Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Meeting, Nat'l
Academy of Arbitrators, 1959).
38 One case consistently singled out for attack illustrates the conflict between the
judicial and arbitral conception of the scope of the arbitrator's function. See, Local

402, Int. Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 App. Div. 917, 67, N.Y.S.2d
317 (1947), aff'd 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947).

39 Cox, op. cit. supra note 36 at 32.
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the arbitrators and courts for jurisdiction to interpret collective bargaining agreements remains to be seen. In any event, it appears that
the pattern of judicial intervention is likely to usher in an era of conceptualism.
A LOOK AHEAD

The evolution of labor arbitration as a method of resolving industrial disputes is the most dynamic force in labor-management relations
today. Less than two decades of age, the device has had a profound
effect on collective bargaining and industrial relations as a whole. It
would seem that as the relationship between union and management
matures, disputes should decrease, the lower steps of the grievance
procedure should be more effective, and the necessity for arbitration
diminish. However, grievance arbitration is growing. Whether this
indicates a relative immaturity in the relationship or is an indication
that arbitration is more than a method of resolving grievances cannot
be easily determined. Perhaps, as Stein suggests, arbitration is becoming an adjunct to the bargaining process and is really a method of
avoiding troublesome problems in negotiating agreements.4 °
The general patterns of labor arbitration which are presently evolving suggest that the ultimate role of arbitration in a system of industrial jurisprudence has not yet been determined. The patterns of legalism and judicial intervention indicate that labor arbitration is
moving from casuistry to some form of positivism, historical or systematic. It is likely that the parties, the courts and the arbitrators
themselves will demand some form of ideological unity in the arbitral
process. Whether this unity will be imposed by the arbitrators or the
courts is an area still in the embryonic stage of development. That a
positivistic approach will eventually rigidify the process seems an historic certainty. Right now, rigidity appears remote (after all, it took
more than a hundred years for English equity to solidify). Although
the future of grievance arbitration may be uncertain, it can safely be
said to remain as the most effective current method of resolving industrial disputes.
40 Stein,

op. cit. supra note 29 at 867.
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